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History of reward biases attentional selection. However, this reward-driven attentional 
bias (RDAB) has not been investigated within the context of the separable components of 
facilitated capture and impaired disengagement. Furthermore, separating these components may 
better clarify the relationship between RDAB and impulsivity. To this end, across 2 experiments, 
the current study aimed to firstly characterize capture and disengagement in RDAB and secondly 
test the relationship between components of RDAB and measures of impulsivity. Across both 
studies participants completed reward-training followed by a modified cueing paradigm using 
previously rewarded and previously unrewarded stimuli as cues. Results demonstrated robust 
effects of facilitated capture and significant effects of impaired disengagement, although these 
effects were restricted to individuals aware of the reward association, either incidentally or 
explicitly. Across both studies, neither capture nor disengagement independently predicted 
impulsivity; however, total RDAB predicted impulsivity in Study 1 only. Possible reasons for 
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Attention is a mechanism through which processing resources are selectively directed to a 
subset of stimuli in the environment. By amplifying visual representations of some stimuli and 
suppressing representations of distractors, attentional selection helps guide behavior toward goal-
relevant or salient stimuli (Hopf et al., 2006; Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004). A growing body of 
research, demonstrates that reward history biases attentional selection, even when reward is no 
longer available or if processing the reward-related stimulus is counterproductive to task goals 
(Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011b; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015). The bulk 
of these studies, though, do not differentiate between facilitated capture to reward and impaired 
disengagement from reward, despite evidence that these processes are separable components of 
attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich, & Cohen, 1987). Furthermore, 
this reward-driven attentional bias (RDAB) may be an individual difference variable with 
clinical utility. For example, RDAB is exaggerated in groups with higher impulsivity, such as 
adolescents and individuals with a history of substance use (Anderson, Faulkner, Rilee, Yantis, 
& Marvel, 2013; Roper, Vecera, & Vaidya, 2014).  However, other work has failed to replicate 
these associations (Anderson et al., 2011b exp 3; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most, & Le Pelley, 
2015 exp 2). I argue that one possibility for these mixed results is that most measures of RDAB 
conflate facilitated capture to reward and impaired disengagement from reward, and that instead 
separating components of capture and disengagement would better characterize cognitive 
processes related to impulsivity.    
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The proposed project aims to address this gap in the literature by explicitly testing how 
RDAB relates to impulsivity. To this end, I will first review the importance of attention in 
decision-making. Secondly, I will describe how reward modifies attentional selection even when 
there is no prospect of reward receipt by (a) acting as a motivator when reward and task-goals 
are compatible, (b) priming attentional selection during tasks that manipulate relevance of certain 
stimulus features, and (c) acting as a distractor when irrelevant to or at odds with task goals. 
Next I will review some methodological considerations that limit our current understanding of 
attentional bias to reward and argue for the importance of separating facilitated capture and 
impaired disengagement for characterizing RDAB. Finally, I will explain how testing the 
separate components of RDAB, facilitated attentional capture and difficulty disengaging, could 
increase the clinical utility of RDAB investigations.  
Attention and Decision-making   
Although allocation of attentional resources happens at an early stage of cognitive 
processing, it influences later-stage preferences and choices (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008). 
Repeatedly, research has shown that manipulating attention affects decisions and behavior. 
Experimental manipulation of attention to a food-item increases the likelihood that item will be 
selected for consumption over an food-item with equal exposure time but no attention 
manipulation (Lim, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2011). There is also evidence to suggest that the 
modification of attention can have targeted effects on substance use. For example, one group of 
researchers used attentional training in social drinkers to demonstrate that simply training 
attention toward alcohol-related cues produced both an increase in the urge to drink alcohol and 
in the amount of beer consumed during a taste test (Field & Eastwood, 2005). On the other hand, 
training attention away from substance cues (Attentional Bias Modification) has shown promise 
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in reducing relapse and associated symptomology in people with a history of substance use. 
However, further understanding of the nature of attentional bias through larger studies and the 
use of more rigorous controls are needed for this type of intervention (Lopes et al., 2015; for 
reviews see (Cox, Fadardi, Intriligator, & Klinger, 2014; Field, Marhe, & Franken, 2014; Lopes 
et al., 2015). Given that changes in attention alone can influence behavior toward appetitive 
stimuli, it is important to understand how individual differences in attentional processing of 
appetitive stimuli might relate to impulsive behavior. 
Reward Biases Attentional Selection 
Attention functions to select the most relevant stimuli in the environment, and reward 
helps to reinforce rules of the environment and update priorities, thus, it is not surprising that 
reward has robust effects on attentional selection. When rewards are compatible with task-goals, 
the reward acts as motivation and performance on voluntary attention tasks improves 
(Engelmann et al., 2009; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2014). Behaviorally, the prospect of reward 
results in decreased reaction times and increases in target detection sensitivity (Engelmann et al., 
2009; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2014). Mechanistically, attentional priority is given to the location 
of reward-related cues, which results in enhanced stimulus representation in early visual 
processing and facilitated responses to stimuli at that location (Bisley & Goldberg, 2010; Peck, 
Jangraw, Suzuki, Efem, & Gottlieb, 2009; Serences, 2008; Serences & Saproo, 2010). 
Furthermore, both EEG and fMRI studies have found markers of enhanced preparatory attention 
following a cue signaling an upcoming trial with prospect for reward (Engelmann et al., 2009; 
Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; van den Berg, Krebs, Lorist, & Woldorff, 2014). Taken together, these 
findings indicate that reward motivates participants to engage attentional resources, which 
influences stimulus processing. 
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Another set of experiments extended these findings to demonstrate that history of reward 
associated with stimulus features biases later attentional selection (Libera & Chelazzi, 2006). 
Specifically, the experimenters were interested in whether reward could induce positive priming, 
which is the facilitation of responses when previous targets serve as current targets, and negative 
priming, which is the decrement in performance when previous targets serve as current 
distractors (Tipper, 1985). After highly rewarded trials, participants showed a negative priming 
effect; the stimulus feature or color that served as a distractor in a highly-rewarded prime trial 
hindered responses when it served as a target in probe trials (Libera & Chelazzi, 2006). A 
follow-up EEG study showed evidence for capture to reward-related stimuli, indicating that 
reward upregulates attentional priority of the reward-related target rather than simply increasing 
suppression of non-reward distractors (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a). This set of 
studies was the earliest to show that reward influenced attentional selection after receiving a 
reward and that reward can diminish performance when used as a distractor. 
These distraction effects appear to be driven by reward-signaling properties. RDAB is 
evident even when the reward-related stimuli never served as a target, and when biasing attention 
to reward always decreased the chance of reward receipt (Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 
2015). Some experiments examined overt attentional capture using eye-tracking and found that 
saccades made earlier in time were more biased toward reward than saccades made later in time 
(Bucker, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2015; Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Le Pelley, & Theeuwes, 
2015; Hickey & van Zoest, 2012; Pearson et al., 2015). The authors interpreted these results to 
mean that (1) reward influences early attentional capture and (2) top-down attentional control 
was necessary to overcome RDAB (Bucker et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2015). Of note is that 
while covert attention tends to be highly related to overt saccadic eye movements (Posner, 1980), 
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effects of reward on attention in peripheral cueing tasks are more robust in covert than overt 
attention tasks (Dunne, Ellison, & Smith, 2015; Pool, Brosch, Delplanque, & Sander, 2014). 
Consequently, paradigms capable of testing covert attentional shifts may be more sensitive to 
reward-related changes in attentional priority. 
Up to this point, the literature reviewed is consistent with reward modulating attention in 
an involuntary, automatic manner; however, because each of the paradigms examined RDAB 
while participants were obtaining rewards within the task, these paradigms cannot rule out that 
RDAB may be dependent on a reward-motivated attentional set for the task (Anderson, 2013). 
With this in mind, the best way to test RDAB while controlling for reward history is to first 
experimentally manipulate reward-association in a training phase and then to test RDAB in a 
separate phase without the prospect for reward. Anderson and colleagues addressed this gap in 
the literature by developing a paradigm with separate testing and training phases (Anderson et 
al., 2011b). Anderson’s design (explained below) will be modified for the proposed experiment’s 
procedure because using separate training and testing phases is the best way to address the 
research questions at hand.  
Within Anderson’s paradigm, participants first completed a training phase that used a 
color-singleton paradigm. The training consisted of a fixation display, a search array consisting 
of six circles, and a feedback display. On every trial, one of the circles would be either red or 
green. Participants used a button-press to report whether a line inside the red or green target 
circle was horizontal or vertical. The five distractor circles each were each a different color. To 
encourage fast-responses, participants were given a short window of time to respond. For correct 
responses, participants received money. The amount of money earned for that trial and the total 
money earned were displayed to participants on the feedback screen. Participants were randomly 
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assigned for either red or green circles to be the high-reward stimulus while the other color 
served as the low-reward stimulus. Correct responses to high-reward stimuli earned a large 
reward (5¢ experiment 1; 10¢ experiment 3) on 80% of trials and a small reward (1¢ experiment 
1; 2¢ experiment 3) on 20% of trials. The reverse proportions were true for low-reward stimuli, 
although participants were not explicitly informed of these contingencies. 
The test phase used a shape singleton paradigm with no prospect for reward. In the test 
phase, the previously rewarded targets always served as distractors in the array. The search array 
now consisted of five circle non-targets and a physically salient shape singleton, a diamond. 
Participants reported the orientation of the white line inside the diamond, which was never red or 
green, and were to ignore all of the circles. On half of the trials, one of the non-targets was either 
red or green, each equally often, and for the other half of the trials, all of the non-targets had no 
association with reward. As such, trials were classified as containing either high-value 
distractors, low-value distractors, or distractor-absent.  
Results showed that participants responded to the target more slowly on trials with high-
value-distractors than on distractor-absent trials, and that there was a linear trend of reward-
magnitude’s influence on reaction time (Anderson et al., 2011b). Effects of reward on response 
time mimicked that of effects of a physically salient distractor (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992), even 
though both physical-salience and top-down attentional set should bias attention to the shape-
singleton (diamond) target. These results are consistent both for long reward-training 
(experiment 1; 1,008 trials) and for short reward-training (experiment 3; 240 trials) and were due 
explicitly to reward manipulation rather than previous selection as a target (experiment 2; 
Anderson et al., 2011b). Evidence of inhibition-of-return, an effect observed when attention is 
withdrawn from a stimulus (Posner, Rafal, Choate, & Vaughan, 1985), to reward-associated 
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distractor locations on immediately subsequent trials supports that RT slowing is attributed to 
attentional capture to reward rather than merely a filtering cost (Anderson et al., 2011b). Further 
corroborating attentional capture to reward, an N2pc component is elicited to reward-related 
distractors in this paradigm (Qi, Zeng, Ding, & Li, 2013). Taken together, these results show that 
associating reward with an arbitrary stimulus can bias attention even when the prospect of 
reward is no longer directly motivating in the task and when such bias is detrimental to task-
goals. This study also demonstrates an inability to resist capture to reward (e.g. Pearson et al., 
2015), as follow-up analyses of response-time distributions show that even the fastest response 
times on high-value distractor trials were slower than distractor-absent trials, which signifies that 
capture occurred consistently across trials (Anderson et al., 2011b).  
Follow-up studies have extended the initial findings. Attentional bias to reward persists 
for several hundred trials and is evident days, weeks, and even several months following initial 
training (Anderson, Kronemer, Rilee, Sacktor, & Marvel, 2016; Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 
2011a; Anderson et al., 2011b; Anderson & Yantis, 2013). While most work is conducted in 
visual attention, attentional bias to reward is not modality specific and can be manipulated in the 
auditory domain (Anderson, 2015a). Differential stimulus-reward pairing is necessary for the 
attentional bias effect and cannot be produced by indiscriminately rewarding responses to targets 
(Sali, Anderson, & Yantis, 2014). When the stimulus-reward pairing is made context specific by 
pairing the stimulus with reward receipt for only certain spatial locations or task-irrelevant 
background images, attentional bias is only exhibited in the trained context (Anderson, 2015b, 
2015c). However, context-specific learning is only evident when the context is relevant to 
training (Mine & Saiki, 2015), and attentional bias to reward can be generalized when the 
training and testing tasks have different formats and task goals (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 
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2012). While these studies have helped to expand our understanding of RDAB, several gaps in 
the literature remain which I address here.  
Awareness of Stimulus-reward association 
First, previous work has indicated that the reward-learning in this paradigm is primarily 
implicit in nature, given that participants did no better than chance at explicitly stating the reward 
contingencies (Anderson, 2015c). Furthermore, biased processing of rewarded stimuli can occur 
without conscious awareness of reward contingencies or even conscious processing of stimuli 
(Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009). Relatively few studies have specifically tested how conscious 
awareness impact RDAB, and the findings are somewhat mixed. One study, with 20% of 
participants correctly identifying the more highly rewarded stimulus, found that RDAB did not 
differ between aware and unaware individuals (Anderson et al., 2013). However, another study 
(with 37% of participants identifying which stimulus was associated with reward) found that 
RDAB was stronger in aware than unaware participants (Bourgeois, Neveu, Bayle, & 
Vuilleumier, 2017). Given the potential for awareness to modulate the strength of RDAB, the 
current study will probe for awareness of reward contingencies. 
Components of RDAB 
 Attentional bias is comprised of both initial orienting toward the stimulus (capture) and 
difficulty reallocating attention toward a more goal-relevant stimulus or location (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Posner et al., 1987). The distinction between these two processes is important in 
attentional bias to substance-related cues in individuals with a history of substance use by 
differentiating rapid, automatic processing bias versus relatively slower processing (see Field, 
Munafò, & Franken, 2009 for review). By conflating capture and disengagement, previous 
RDAB studies may have been insensitive to individual differences that might be more closely 
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linked to one of the two components. Here, I employed Anderson’s reward training paradigm to 
associate reward with a given stimulus. I then test RDAB in a paradigm (adapted from Failing 
and Theeuwes, 2014) with different task goals and stimuli arrangements than in training. This 
extends previous RDAB work using Anderson’s paradigm by differentiating the fast, more 
automatic component of RDAB (capture) and the slower, more controlled component of RDAB 
(disengagement). Furthermore, unlike previous work, which used matching targets, task goals, 
and search arrays in training and testing, the current study tests RDAB when the stimuli 
arrangement, task goals, and targets differ between training and testing. Finally, by separating 
RDAB into the elements of facilitated capture and impaired disengagement, I aim to better 
characterize the relationship between RDAB and impulsivity. 
Impaired disengagement from reward-related stimuli may be more closely linked with 
individual differences in cognitive control over reward than facilitated capture. Disengaging 
from distractor-stimuli that have already captured attention requires reactive attentional control 
in the form of distractor suppression (Geng, 2014). Disengagement of attention may be 
particularly important to measure, as emotional arousal level associated with a stimulus 
influences disengagement more than capture (Vogt, De Houwer, Koster, Van Damme, & 
Crombez, 2008). Furthermore, disengagement from emotional stimuli (rather than capture) has 
been more closely associated with  individual variability in personality (Derryberry & Reed, 
1994) and impaired disengagement from substance cues has shown marginally larger 
relationships with individual variability in substance-use cravings, although the trending 
significance of this result implies it should be interpreted cautiously (Field et al., 2009). Finally, 
the predictive power of RDAB in substance use literature is strongest among individuals with 
lower executive functioning (Colder & O’Connor, 2002; van Hemel-Ruiter, de Jong, Ostafin, & 
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Wiers, 2015), which is consistent with the importance of isolating impaired disengagement (the 
component of RDAB linked with executive functioning. It is likely that delayed time-to-
disengage contributed to variability in reaction times when using Anderson’s paradigm: a median 
split analysis indicated that an N2pc component, indexing capture, was exhibited for both fast 
and slow trials (Qi et al., 2013); however, a later positive deflection component, an ERP measure 
associated with efficient suppression of distractors (Sawaki & Luck, 2013; Schupp et al., 2007), 
was only evident on fast trials (Qi et al., 2013).  
Difficulty disengaging from distractors is also related to executive functioning, consistent 
with the likely role of the prefrontal cortex in mediating distractor suppression. Fukuda and 
Vogel (2009, 2011), showed that attentional bias is greater in individuals with low compared to 
high working memory capacity. This difference stemmed specifically from individuals with low-
capacity’s slowed disengagement from distractors. Findings that reduced visual working memory 
is linked to greater RDAB (Anderson et al., 2011b) are likely driven by difficulty disengaging 
from reward-related distractors. An individual’s ability to suppress pre-potent responses, 
cognitive control, is thought to be related to individual variability in attentional control 
(Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Posner & Rothbart, 2000). Pre-frontal regions are involved in 
effective response suppression (e.g. Blasi et al., 2006; Goghari & MacDonald, 2009), have a 
down-regulatory influence on affective regions, such as the basal ganglia (Miller & Cohen, 
2001), and such down-regulatory activity helps mitigate substance-use cravings (Kober et al., 
2010). Similarly, there is evidence to suggest that pre-frontal control over affective regions is 
crucial to effective disengagement from emotionally salient threat stimuli (see Cisler & Koster, 
2010). Furthermore, for individuals who did not show RDAB during the testing phase, striatal 
dopamine levels when a reward-related distractor was present were actually suppressed 
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(Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016). During testing, individuals without evidence of RDAB not 
only showed reduced dopamine levels as compared to other people, but showed a suppression of 
dopamine when performing the task with reward-related distractors relative to the same task 
without reward-related distractors (Anderson, 2016). These individuals may be recruiting top-
down control to suppress striatal activity, and therefore eliminate attentional bias to reward-
related stimuli when such bias is at odds with contextual goals.   
On the other hand, facilitated capture to reward appears to be less modulated by cognitive 
control (Geng, 2014). Emotional significance of a distractor can drive initial orienting to that 
stimulus (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Capture to reward-related stimuli has been shown 
consistently across trials within participants, as demonstrated by reaction time distributions 
(Anderson et al., 2011b). There is some evidence to suggest that initial capture to reward-related 
stimuli cannot be effortfully prevented, because individuals exhibit attentional capture to reward-
related distractors to the same degree regardless of whether they are given the opportunity to 
control their attention by being made aware of negative contingencies of attending to that 
stimulus (Pearson et al., 2015). A meta-analysis confirms that the effects of capture in RDAB are 
overall more consistently present across studies and stronger than disengagement (Pool, Brosch, 
Delplanque, & Sander, 2016). Furthermore, rather than being related to aspects of executive 
functioning, capture to reward-related stimuli has been linked with heightened reward response 
(Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016; Qi et al., 2013). 
Given the different potential underlying mechanisms and relationship to clinically 
significant differences, it is important to differentiate capture and disengagement when 
examining RDAB. Thus far, there is a greater amount of evidence for the existence of facilitated 
capture to reward than difficulty disengaging, although reward influences both components 
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significantly (Pool et al., 2016). For example, Raymond and O’Brien (2009) manipulated reward 
association with faces that were later used in an attentional blink paradigm. Their results showed 
that a reward-associated face was more likely to survive attentional blink, indicating facilitated 
processing, but that reward-associated faces did not extend the attentional blink as compared to a 
neutral face, indicating no increased difficulty disengaging (Raymond & O’Brien, 2009). 
However, this should be interpreted cautiously, because faces are known to hold attention longer 
than neutral stimuli (Parks, Kim, & Hopfinger, 2014), and consequently the influence of faces 
and reward on extended attentional processing may not be additive. 
Another study used pavlovian conditioning with puffs of chocolate odor to manipulate 
reward-assocatiation to visual stimuli and tested reward bias in a cueing paradigm (Pool et al., 
2014). While results indicated that reward enhanced initial capture, but did not affect 
disengagement, limitations in the training paradigm make these results somewhat inconclusive. 
Passive reward-association paradigms are less likely to form associations quickly (e.g. in one 
experimental session), because ventral striatal activation, which is involved in stimulus-reward 
paring is reduced in passive receipt tasks as compared to active tasks in which reward receipt is 
dependent upon a correct response (Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, Chappelow, & Berns, 2004). 
Less than optimal reward training was made evident by the fact that only half of the participants 
were effectively conditioned as measured by self-report and reaction times (Pool et al., 2014).   
Some evidence for difficulty disengaging from reward-related stimuli stems from 
modified Stroop (1935) paradigms in which participants are asked to name the ink-color of 
color-named-words and some ink-colors are associated with reward. Suppression of emotionally 
salient stimuli in emotional Stroop paradigms is more closely linked to disengagement of 
attention than orienting (Phaf & Kan, 2007).  Reward-related Stroop paradigms have shown that 
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task-irrelevant reward-associated semantic meaning slows down response time as compared to 
neutral words (Krebs, Boehler, Egner, & Woldorff, 2011; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). 
Importantly, activity in the pre-supplementary motor area, an area involved in exerting control 
over responses when response conflict arises (Nachev, Wydell, O’Neill, Husain, & Kennard, 
2007), was highly selective to trials in which reward-associated features conflicted with task 
goals (Krebs et al., 2011).  
Support for disengagement has also been found in covert spatial attention. Failing and 
Theeuwes (2014) manipulated reward-association and then tested it using a double-cue 
paradigm. This demonstrated that people were slower to disengage from rewarding stimuli than 
neutral stimuli, as operationalized by comparing reaction times for trials in which both non-
predictive cues were neutral with trials in which both a neutral cue and reward cue were 
presented and the target appeared at the neutral location.  This acts to support that difficulty 
disengaging from reward contributes to RDAB. Importantly, the task goals, stimuli, and targets 
were identical in both training and testing. This is a meaningful distinction given that attention is 
impacted by top-down attentional sets (Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994), so if task goals are 
the same between training and testing, reward bias may be inadvertently primed in testing. Of 
primary interest is bias toward stimuli with a history of reward when reward bias is at-odds with 
task goals and contextually uninformative. Given evidence that the paradigm designed by Failing 
and Theeuwes (2014) can differentiate capture and disengagement, this paradigm will be utilized 
in the testing phase of the current experiment; however, to test RDAB across contexts and ensure 
that RDAB is not due to priming related to task goals, the current study will implement the 
Anderson (2011b) reward-training paradigm. 
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Given the links between disengagement and other frontal control processes as well as the 
more pervasive and automatic nature of capture within RDAB, I hypothesize that impulsivity is 
more likely to be linked to difficulty disengaging than it is to capture. Impulsivity has been 
defined as acting prematurely and without forethought (Dickman, 1993). This construct is 
associated with conduct disorder, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, and risk-taking 
behaviors, such as substance use and risky sex practices (Ahn, Ramesh, Moeller, & Vassileva, 
2016; Castellanos-Ryan, Rubia, & Conrod, 2011; Herrman, Hand, Johnson, Badger, & Heil, 
2014; Winstanley, Eagle, & Robbins, 2006). It has been proposed that impulsivity is linked to 
the prefrontal cortex and modulated by the reward-related fronto-striatal system (Bechara, 2005; 
Bechara & Van Der Linden, 2005). Given that resistance to impulsivity requires top-down 
prefrontal cortical communications with sub-cortical areas such as the ventral striatum and basal 
ganglia (Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011), it seems 
likely that individuals with disrupted impulsivity will also exhibit difficulty disengaging from 
reward-related stimuli.  
The research thus far that has been conducted to test a relationship between RDAB and 
impulsivity has used the BIS-11, and findings are somewhat inconsistent. Some experiments 
have found relationships between impulsivity and RDAB (Anderson, Kronemer, et al., 2016; 
Anderson et al., 2011b exp 1); however, others have not replicated that finding (Anderson et al., 
2011b exp 3; Pearson et al., 2015 exp 2), or even found an inverse relationship (Pearson et al., 
2015 exp 1). RDAB is also exaggerated in populations shown to be higher on impulsivity, such 
as adolescents and individuals with a  history of substance use (Anderson et al., 2013; Roper et 
al., 2014). Conflating facilitated capture to reward and impaired disengagement likely 
contributes to the inconsistent findings, which I will test in the current study. 
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Summary and Current Study 
 Reward-related disruptions in cognitive control, such as is evidenced by RDAB, have 
been well documented; however, relatively little research has been dedicated toward examining 
the attentional components that make-up RDAB. Attention research and literature on attentional 
bias in other populations has revealed that differentiating components of attentional bias 
(facilitated capture and slowed disengagement) is important, because these components differ in 
their driving mechanisms and relationships to individual differences in behavior. The few studies 
that have examined facilitated capture and impaired disengagement in RDAB provide some 
initial support for these processes; however, methodological considerations described above (e.g. 
use of faces and identical training and testing paradigms) limit the generalizability of these 
findings. Furthermore, because of its potential for clinical utility, some studies have tested the 
relationship between RDAB and impulsivity with mixed results. One possibility for this 
inconsistency is that no study to date has tested the relationship between impulsivity and 
individual components of RDAB, leaving the mechanisms of this relationship unclear. Without 
examining components of RDAB individually, it is impossible to elucidate whether impulsivity 
is linked to reward more easily capturing attention (failures in proactive attentional control) or 
deficits in disengaging from reward in order to accomplish contextual goals (failures in reactive 
attentional control) or both. Understanding these mechanisms has implications for future 
interventions that could then more specifically target attentional monitoring and reducing 
distractibility or suppressing distractors and more quickly reorienting attention to goal relevant 
aspects of the environment.  
The proposed study aims to address these gaps in the literature by pairing Anderson’s 
reward-training paradigm with a cueing paradigm designed to specifically test facilitated capture 
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to reward-related distractors and difficulty disengaging from reward-related distractors (adopted 
from Failing & Theeuwes, 2014). In training, one stimulus will be associated with reward, while 
another will be trained but never rewarded. These stimuli will then be used as non-predictive 
cues in the cueing paradigm when reward prospect is no longer available. It is hypothesized that 
individuals will show both facilitated capture to reward and impaired disengagement from 
reward. It is also expected that individual differences in impulsivity is related to impaired 







Participants and Overall Design. All procedures were approved by the UNC Chapel 
Hill Institutional Review Board. Participants were 41 healthy adults (ages 18-23, 56% female) 
with self-reported normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and no colorblindness, which was 
confirmed using the Ishihara Color vision test (Ishihara, 1973). Participants were recruited via 
flyers and a university listserv. Monetary compensation was provided based on participant 
performance (mean = $14.92). Cognitive tasks and questionnaires were completed in a 1 hour 
study visit. Attentional bias to reward was first manipulated in a reward training task and then 
tested using a modified Posner cueing paradigm. 
Reward Association Training. Reward was associated with a given colored circle using 
a training paradigm adapted from Anderson and colleagues (2011b). Training trials consisted of 
a fixation screen, followed by a search array, and then a feedback screen on a gray background 
(Figure 1). The white fixation cross (0.5˚ x 0.5˚ visual angle) was presented for a random interval 
of 400, 500, or 600 ms on each trial. The search array consisted of six circles (2.3˚ x 2.3˚ visual 
angle) placed at equal intervals at an imaginary circle with a 5˚ radius around the fixation cross. 
Each circle was a different color and contained a white line. For half of the participants, one of 
the circles was either red or green on every trial, with the red or green circle being the target 
circle. For the other half of the participants, one of the circles was either blue or yellow on every 
trial, with the blue or yellow circle as the target circle. Participants were instructed to indicate 
with a keyboard response whether the white line inside the target circle was vertical or horizontal 
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by pressing the appropriate key with their index finger. Participants had 800 ms to respond. After 
the search display, a feedback display showed the amount of money earned (if any) and the 
current total. If no response was given within the time-frame, a 500ms 1,000 Hz feedback tone 
informed participants that the trial timed out, and the feedback screen displayed “Slow” along 
with the current total money.   
The color of the rewarded target (green, red, blue, or yellow) was counterbalanced across 
participants. For the rewarded target, 80% of trials were worth 12 cents and 20% were worth no 
money. For the unrewarded target, all trials were worth no money. Training consisted of 360 
trials across 3 blocks, and was preceded by a practice block of 50 trials. All tasks were 
programmed using OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) and stimuli were 
presented on a 22 inch color monitor with a refresh rate of 60 frames per second. All tasks were 
completed in a sound-attenuated booth. Participants were seated in a chair such that their eyes 
were approximately 75 cm from the screen, as measured by a trained research assistant.  
Reward Bias Testing. The testing paradigm (Figure 2) was a cueing paradigm modified 
from Failing and Theeuwes (2014). Testing trials consisted of a fixation, a double-cue display, 
and a target display. The fixation was displayed for a randomly determined period of 400-600 
ms. The cue display was presented for 200 ms and consisted of two differently colored circles 
(red, green, yellow, or blue; 3.4˚ diameter) with figure-eight placeholders inside the circles (2.3˚ 
x 1.1˚). After 200ms, an offset of two line segments in each of the figure-eight premasks 
revealed the target display. The target display consisted of the same circles as the cueing display, 
but with a letter revealed inside each circle (“S”, “P”, “H”, “E”; 2.3˚ x 1.1˚). One of the two 
letters was a target letter (“S” or “P”) and the other was a distractor letter (“H” or “E”). 
Participants were instructed to indicate with a keyboard response which target letter was present 
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by pressing the appropriate key with their index finger. The target display remained on the screen 
for 800 ms or until a response was given. For this phase, participants were explicitly informed 
that they would not receive money for their performance and that the circles were unrelated to 
the location of the target letter, emphasizing the color of the circles was task-irrelevant. 
Participants completed a 48 trials practice block prior to both training and testing. Testing 
consisted of 496 trials across 5 blocks. Trials were coded as previously rewarded (PR), 
previously unrewarded (PU), neutral, or both trained present according to the cue types present 
(Figure 3). 
Impulsivity. Participants completed the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11),  a 30-item 
self-report that is one of the most widely used scales for impulsivity (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 
1995). The BIS-11 has and significant test-retest reliability (Stanford et al., 2009) and shows 
good internal consistency in this sample (α = .87).  
Reward-contingency Awareness. Awareness of the reward-association in training was 
probed using a set of questions adapted from Anderson (2015b). A binary variable of whether 
participants correctly picked the reward contingency from 6 possible options (Appendix A) was 
used to define aware and unaware groups.  
Analysis. Attentional bias effects were measured using reaction time (RT). Any RTs 
below 100 ms were excluded from further analyses, as these responses are likely too fast to 
reflect accurate target discrimination, leaving 99.7% of data across both Study 1 and Study 2. 
Only correct responses were used to calculate reaction time. All analyses controlled for gender, 
because there is some evidence from rodent models that reward extinction may differ between 
males and females (Hammerslag & Gulley, 2014). For any instances in which Mauchly’s test 
indicates that the assumption of sphericity should be rejected for the data when implementing an 
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analysis of variance (ANOVA), Greenhouse-Geisser corrected degrees of freedom and 
probability values are reported.  
 In order to test a linear-effect of orienting, an ANOVA was conducted on RT using a 
within-subjects factor of trial type (invalid PR, neutral, valid PR). Follow-up ANOVAs were 
used to test paired differences for overall attentional bias (invalid PR minus valid PR), facilitated 
capture (neutral minus valid PR), and impaired disengagement (invalid PR minus neutral). While 
the PR trial types are of primary interest, similar follow-up analyses will be conducted for the 
trial types of previously unrewarded (PU) and both PR and PU present. These follow-up analyses 
will determine whether a similar bias can be elicited from training alone (PU) and whether 
reward-driven bias is exhibited above and beyond training alone when both trial types are present 
(both trained present). All analyses included awareness of reward contingencies as a between 
subjects factor, and interactions between reward effects and awareness were tested. 
 We hypothesized that impaired disengagement from reward would be linked with 
individual differences in impulsivity, while controlling for individual differences in facilitated 
capture. This was tested using a linear regression predicting self-reported BIS-11 scores from a 
disengagement score (invalid – neutral RT) and capture score (neutral – valid RT). The 
regression was conducted for PR trial types, PU trial types, and both trained present trial types. 
This allows for determination if the relationship to impulsivity is reward-specific or due to 
training.  
Results. 
Awareness Groups. Awareness of the reward contingencies present during training were 
probed using a 1-item response at the end of the experiment with 6 response options (Appendix 
A). Based on their responses, 17 participants were classified as aware of the training reward-
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contingencies and 24 participants were classified as unaware. Independent samples t-tests 
confirmed that Aware and Unaware participants showed no differences on impulsivity, average 
RT on training, accuracy on training, amount of money earned, or average RT on testing, all p’s 
> .1. While accuracy was generally high across participants in the testing phase, Aware 
participants showed a higher accuracy overall on testing (M = 92.2%, SD = 3.2%) than Unaware 
participants (M = 89.6%, SD = 4.2%), t(39) = 2.12, p = .04.  
Training. A mixed measures ANOVA was conducted to test for a reward-driven training 
effect with reward (rewarded, unrewarded) as a within-subjects factor, with awareness (aware, 
unaware) as a between-subjects factor. In this analysis there was a trending effect of reward on 
RT, F(1, 38) = 2.92, p = .10, η2 = .07, which was qualified by a significant reward by awareness 
interaction, F(1, 38) = 12.55, p < .01, η2 = .25. As shown in Figure 4, follow-up analyses 
revealed that aware participants were faster on rewarded compared to unrewarded trials, F(1, 15) 
= 6.40, p = .02, η2 = .30. There was no effect of reward in the unaware group, p = .52.  
Components of Reward-Driven Attentional Bias. Attentional bias was measured in the 
cueing phase, during which participants no longer received money for performance and none of 
the circle cues were predictive of the target location. There were four cue types (Figure 3), 
previously rewarded (PR), previously unrewarded (PU), neutral (both circles untrained), and 
both trained present (both PR and PU). It was hypothesized that reward-driven attentional bias 
would exhibit a linear orienting pattern, consistent with RDAB, such that participants would be 
fastest for PR valid, followed by neutral trials, and slowest for PR invalid trials. A mixed-
measures ANOVA with a within-subjects factor of trial type (PR invalid, neutral, PR valid) and 
between-subjects factor of awareness confirmed an effect of trial-type, F(1.73, 65.70) = 3.63, p = 
.04, η2 = .09. Within-subjects contrasts demonstrated that the effect was linear, as hypothesized, 
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F(1, 38) = 6.00, p = .02, η2 = .14. This effect was qualified by an interaction with awareness, 
F(1.73, 65.70) = 3.78, p = .03, η2 = .09 (Figure 5). 
Due to the awareness by reward-effect interactions, follow-up analyses were conducted 
separately for aware and unaware participants. Aware individuals were faster on valid relative to 
invalid PR trials, F(1, 15) = 6.96, p = .02, η2 = .32, indicating an overall attentional bias to 
reward. This was further characterized by a significant effect of facilitated capture (valid relative 
to neutral; Table 1), F(1, 15) = 15.48, p < .01, η2 = . 51, and no effect of impaired disengagement 
(invalid relative to neutral; Table 1), p = .52. Within the unaware group, there was no evidence 
of overall attentional bias to reward, facilitated capture to reward, or impaired disengagement 
from reward, p’s > .1.  
Performance on trial types with both PR and PU cues present were investigated to test 
whether this reward bias was exhibited beyond previously trained but never rewarded cues. A 
similar mixed measures ANOVA with factors of trial type and awareness was conducted for both 
PR and PU present cues. There was no effect of trial type or interaction with awareness, p’s > .1. 
To test whether the results of attentional bias were due to training alone, performance on trials 
with PU trial types (i.e. PU vs. Neutral) was examined. For PU cues, there was no effect of trial 
type or interaction with awareness, p’s > .1, indicating no attentional bias to cues that were 
trained but never rewarded.  
Relationships to Impulsivity.To test whether separate components of reward-driven 
attentional bias independently predict impulsivity, a linear regression predicting BIS-11 score 
from disengagement score, capture score, and awareness status was conducted. Separate 
regressions were conducted using performance on (1) PR trials, (2) PU trials, and (3) PR and PU 
present trials. None of these models significantly explained variance in impulsivity, p’s > .1, 
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indicating that neither facilitated capture nor impaired disengagement from reward-related cues 
is linked with impulsivity. Given that previous research has investigated relationships between 
attentional bias to reward and impulsivity using total attentional bias scores (i.e. invalid RT – 
valid RT; Table 1), follow-up regression analyses were conducted predicting BIS-11 scores from 
total attentional bias and  awareness status. Separate regressions were conducted using 
performance on (1) PR trials, (2) PU trials, and (3) PR and PU present trials. Total attentional 
bias to the PR cue on both trained present (PR and PU) trials explained 18.1% of the variance in 
impulsivity, F(3, 37) = 3.95, p = .02 (Table 2). Interestingly, the regression model with total 
attentional bias to reward explained variance in impulsivity better than a model with capture and 
disengagement entered separately. This is despite the fact that correlational analyses show no 
relationship between capture and disengagement on both trained present trials, r(39) = .19, p = 
.25, indicating that these are separable components. Total attentional bias on PR trials and on PU 
trials did not significantly explain variance in impulsivity, p’s > .1.  
Relationship between Reward-training and Reward-driven Attentional Bias. 
Previous work has demonstrated that individual differences in reward-biasing during training 
predicted RDAB in testing (Failing & Theeuwes, 2014). In the current study, the paradigms used 
in training and testing differed in both task goals and stimulus configurations. Our results 
demonstrating RDAB in testing already show a transfer of reward learning; however, here we are 
testing whether the degree of learning in training can predict the degree of interference by reward 
in testing. As has been used previously (Failing & Theeuwes, 2014), here we tested this 
relationship using a correlational analysis. Training bias was calculated as the difference between 
RT for trials with the rewarded circle and RT for trials with the unrewarded circle. RDAB in 
testing was calculated using the total attentional bias score (Table 1) first for PR trials and then 
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for both trained present (PR and PU) trials. There is a significant relationship between reward 
bias in training and reward bias on PR trials, r(39) = .45, p < .01, as well as a significant 
relationship between training and reward bias on both present trials, r(39) = .32, p = .04.  
Discussion. 
 This study was designed to test how reward-training to a stimulus in a search array would 
impact attentional bias to that stimulus in the context of a separate task in which reward-prospect 
was no longer present. Specifically, this study aimed to characterize facilitated attentional 
capture and impaired disengagement from previously rewarded stimuli. Consistent with RDAB, 
our results demonstrate that when a circle with a history of reward is present, participants are 
faster to respond to a target that appears in the previously rewarded circle than if it appears in the 
opposite location; however, this effect was specific to individuals who were aware of the reward 
contingencies (i.e. could identify which circle was worth money).  
Across both training and testing, effects of reward were only present in individuals who 
became aware of the reward-association. While awareness of reward contingencies has not been 
of primary interest within the attentional bias to reward literature, this has been investigated 
more broadly within affective learning. Some research in fear conditioning paradigms suggest 
that skin conductance response to conditioned stimuli is only evident in individuals who are 
aware of the contingencies, either through explicit instruction or incidental awareness (Hamm & 
Weike, 2005; Purkis & Lipp, 2001; Tabbert et al., 2011; Tabbert, Stark, Kirsch, & Vaitl, 2006). 
And indeed, contingency awareness has been hypothesized to mediate the relationship between 
associated learning and expression of conditioned responses (Lovibond, 2003, 2004). However, 
this claim is at odds with findings that other expressions of fear learning, such as startle response 
and amygdala reactivity, occurs independent of contingency awareness (Knight, Waters, & 
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Bandettini, 2009; Smith, Clark, Manns, & Squire, 2005; Wiens & Öhman, 2002). Furthermore, 
reward learning can be found even when the rewards themselves are outside of conscious 
awareness (Bijleveld, Custers, & Aarts, 2010; Bijleveld et al., 2014; Custers & Aarts, 2010; 
Pessiglione et al., 2007), indicating that conscious awareness is not an essential component of the 
acquisition of reward association. However, compared to when rewards are presented 
subliminally, when rewards are presented consciously, they show greater impact on expended 
effort, task strategies, and neural activity in task-related and reward-related regions (Aarts, 
Custers, & Marien, 2008; Bijleveld et al., 2010, 2014). These findings suggest that it is possible 
for affective learning to occur outside conscious awareness but may be amplified by awareness.  
Most RDAB research does not report interactions with awareness, in the few studies that 
have reported on awareness, participants were unaware of reward contingencies or there was not 
an effect of awareness on RDAB (Anderson, 2015c; Anderson et al., 2013). It should be noted, 
though, that in these studies, relatively few (less than 20%) of participants can be classified as 
aware (Anderson, 2015c; Anderson et al., 2013), and so they may be underpowered to detect 
moderating effects of awareness. In the current study 41% of participants were aware of reward 
contingencies and all reward-related findings in training and testing interacted with awareness. A 
study with a similar proportion of aware participants ( 37%) found reward-effects in both aware 
and unaware participants, but showed that awareness moderated RDAB such that it was strongest 
in aware participants (Bourgeois et al., 2017).While the debate regarding the role of contingency 
awareness in RDAB is far from resolved, this study provides some support that becoming aware 
of reward-contingencies in training is linked with the maintenance of RDAB after the prospect of 
reward has been removed.  
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As hypothesized, training reward association in a search array lead to RDAB in a cueing 
paradigm.  This finding extends previous research that used similar or identical training and 
testing paradigms (Anderson et al., 2011a; Failing & Theeuwes, 2014) to demonstrate that 
RDAB can be elicited even when training and testing differ in task goals and target stimuli. 
Furthermore, the degree to which participants biased toward reward in training on the search 
array predicted their reward-related biasing in testing on the cueing paradigm, when the prospect 
of reward was no longer present, providing more support that reward-learning to a stimulus in 
one paradigm is transferrable to a different testing context.  A linear orienting effect was 
observed for previously rewarded circles, such that participants were fastest when the target 
appeared in the rewarded circle, somewhat slower on neutral trials, and slowest for trial when the 
target appeared in the position opposite the rewarded circle. While this linear effect is consistent 
with both impaired disengagement and facilitated capture to reward, direct pairwise comparisons 
revealed a significant effect of facilitated capture but not impaired disengagement. This suggests 
that while findings are in the expected direction for both components, facilitated capture to 
reward is the more prominent effect. While previous work using this paradigm has found both 
effects of capture and disengagement (Failing & Theeuwes, 2014), the present findings are 
consistent with a meta-analysis indicating that facilitated capture to reward is a more robust 
effect than impaired disengagement (Pool et al., 2016) and is consistent with the hypothesis that 
there may be more variability in the disengagement effect. Furthermore, previous work has 
indicated that facilitated capture to reward is difficult to resist and occurs consistently on every 
trial, making it a more robust effect (Anderson et al., 2011b; Pearson et al., 2015; Qi et al., 
2013). Because there was no attentional bias exhibited to previously unrewarded cues, this effect 
is reward-specific and not due to training alone.  
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This study did not replicate previous findings that attentional bias to reward is exhibited 
when both previously rewarded and previously unrewarded cues are presented at the same time 
(Failing & Theeuwes, 2014). The results show that for this trial type, there was no effect of 
reward for either aware or unaware participants. This may be because, the study conducted by 
Failing and Theeuwes (2014) used the same cueing paradigm for both training and testing, which 
may have contributed to stronger reward effects. Additionally, reward effects in this study are 
only evident for aware participants, and so the current study may have been underpowered to 
detect effects in this more stringent contrast in only 17 aware participants. This final possibility 
is consistent with the fact that direct comparisons between PR and PU stimuli used in training 
appears to less consistently yield significant differences (Anderson et al., 2013, 2011b).  
  Finally, this study aimed to investigate the link between RDAB and impulsivity. It was 
hypothesized that disengagement would be more closely linked with impulsivity, because 
disengagement has been linked with executive functioning (Fukuda & Vogel, 2009, 2011) and 
disengagement from affective cues requires the recruitment of top-down control over subcortical 
regions (for review see Cisler & Koster, 2010). As such, it was expected that impaired 
disengagement would encompass both aspects of biased affective processing and failures in top-
down control that would better relate to impulsivity than total attentional bias or capture alone. 
Results instead support that impulsivity is linked with total attentional bias to reward (RDAB) 
but neither facilitated capture nor impaired disengagement alone predicted impulsivity. 
Interestingly, this finding is specific to trials with both previously rewarded and previously 
unrewarded cues, indicating that impulsivity is related to the degree to which attention is biased 
toward reward above and beyond training history alone. There was neither a main effect of 
awareness on impulsivity, nor was there an interactive effect, indicating that this reward-bias 
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predicted impulsivity across both aware and unaware individuals.  Impulsivity has been linked 
with performance on visual tasks (Dickman & Meyer, 1988) as well as with reward sensitivity 
(Martin & Potts, 2004). And it is theorized that impulsivity reflects at least in part an inability to 
inhibit prepotent responses (Aichert et al., 2012). Our results indicate that impulsive individuals 
are more likely to perpetuate reward-related attentional biases even after the prospect of reward 
is removed. This finding indicates that total attentional bias may better encompass that processes 
linked with impulsivity than disengagement or capture alone. Impulsivity is a construct that 
encompasses actions initiated without thought for the future, which are inappropriate to the 
situation, or which are premature (Daruna & Barnes, 1993). Neurally, impulsivity is 
characterized in failures of top-down prefrontal control over striatal, reward-related, regions 
(Bechara, 2005; Bechara & Van Der Linden, 2005; Chambers et al., 2009; Dalley et al., 2011). 
While disengagement is related to executive functioning and has been characterized by top-down 
control over subcortical regions, facilitated capture to reward has been linked with individual 
differences in reward sensitivity (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016; Hickey, Chelazzi, & 
Theeuwes, 2010b; Qi et al., 2013). It may be that the conjunction of these two processes better 
captures both variability in reward sensitivity and executive functioning that are linked with 
impulsivity. Additionally, impulsivity was measured using the BIS-11, which generally assesses 
impulsivity outside of affective contexts. Given that RDAB assesses attentional control in the 
face of rewarding stimuli, this study leaves open the possibility that affective impulsivity (i.e. 
impulsivity in the context of strong positive or negative emotions) may be more closely linked 
with RDAB and show differential patterns of associations between capture and disengagement. 
In summary, these results extend previous work on RDAB by better characterizing the 
components of RDAB and its relationship to impulsivity as well as highlighting the importance 
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of explicit awareness of reward contingencies. RDAB is elicited in contexts where reward is no 
longer available, even when the testing and reward-training paradigms differ. However, these 
effects are restricted to individuals who are aware of which stimulus was associated with reward, 
indicating an importance of explicit awareness in either the development or maintenance of 
RDAB. Furthermore, while a general orienting effect is found, this effect is characterized by a 
significant facilitated capture effect, but impaired disengagement effect does not reach 
significance. This is consistent with previous findings that point toward facilitated capture 
generally being a more robust effect than disengagement.  
Despite these contributions to the literature, there are remaining questions that require 
further investigation, which will be addressed in a follow-up study. Firstly, due to the interaction 
effects with awareness, effects of RDAB were investigated in a relatively small (n = 17) sample. 
This limits the ability to interpret the effect of disengagement not reaching significance, 
particularly in light of the linear orienting effect. Secondly, it is unclear at which point 
participants became aware of the association (e.g. early in training, late in training, or after 
training altogether), and this variable was not controlled in Study 1. In an effort to increase 
power for investigations of components of RDAB and to control for individual differences in 
when participants become aware of the reward association, the follow-up study will make all 
participants explicitly aware of which colored circle is associated with reward at the onset of 
training.  Finally, results of this study indicate that there is a relationship between RDAB and 
impulsivity; however, impulsivity was measured only in terms of self-report using the BIS-11. 
This serves as a useful first step, given that previous research testing relationships between 
RDAB and impulsivity have also used this measure; however, impulsivity itself has been 
identified as a multifaceted construct (Evenden, 1999; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). As such, 
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Study 2 will include multiple measures of impulsivity that have been selected to capture 









Results of Study 1 served as an initial step in characterizing components of RDAB and 
the relationship between RDAB and impulsivity. However, there are some findings that require 
further investigation. Reward learning tends to be stronger in the context of awareness 
(Lovibond, 2003, 2004), and the results of Study 1 highlighted the potential importance of 
explicit awareness of reward-contingencies in developing and maintaining RDAB. Importantly, 
Study 1 cannot differentiate whether better reward-learning led to awareness or whether 
awareness led to better reward learning. Without explicitly manipulating awareness, some 
participants may become aware of the reward-contingencies later than others or not at all.  This 
follow-up study was designed to address this issue by making all participants explicitly aware of 
which stimulus is worth money prior to beginning reward training in Study 2. It is hypothesized 
that by explicitly making participants aware of reward contingencies in Study 2, the effects of 
RDAB will be stronger, thus increasing power to address the research questions at hand.  
Additionally, Study 1 demonstrated that attentional bias to previously rewarded relative 
to previously unrewarded stimuli is correlated with self-reported impulsivity; however, 
impulsivity was measured only using self-report on the BIS-11. The BIS-11 has been used 
previously when RDAB studies have investigated relationships to impulsivity (Anderson, 
Kronemer, et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2011b; Pearson et al., 2015). One of the primary benefits 
of utilizing the BIS-11 is that it has been arguably the most widely used self-report measure of 
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impulsivity across both research and clinical settings, which provides a rich context for which 
one can understand relationships to BIS-11 scores (Stanford et al., 2009). However, the BIS-11 
measures impulsivity quite generally, not specifically impulsivity in the context of affect, which 
we might expect to be more related to the RDAB task.  Recently a scale of impulsivity has been 
developed that aims to measure impulsivity in the context of affect (Lynam, Smith, Cyders, 
Fischer, & Whiteside, 2006).  In addition to measuring the more “cold” constructs of impulsivity 
measured in the BIS-11, the Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, Sensation Seeking, Positive 
Urgency, Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS-P) measures impulsive behavior in the context of 
positive and negative affect (i.e. positive and negative urgency respectively). Because RDAB 
measures failures in cognitive control in the face of rewarding stimuli, it is possible that this 
cognitive process may be more closely linked with affective forms of impulsivity, which this 
study will clarify.  
Additionally, impulsivity has been identified as a multifaceted construct, and thus far no 
one behavioral task adequately captures variance in the more complex construct of impulsivity 
(Cyders & Coskunpinar, 2011); however, some tasks have been developed to measure specific 
facets of impulsivity. The Go/No-Go task is a measure of motor disinhibition and has been 
linked with impulsivity (see Bari & Robbins, 2013 for review). The Delay Discounting Task has 
been developed as a measure of impulsive choice responding, with a willingness to forgo larger 
gains for more immediate rewards being indicative of greater levels of impulsivity (Reimers, 
Maylor, Stewart, & Chater, 2009). We have preliminary evidence in study 1 that RDAB is also 
linked with impulsivity, one important question is if this new task provides additional 
information over and above these existing associations.  Thus, as a follow up analysis we sought 
to determine whether RDAB is more closely related to self-report measures of impulsivity than 
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other typically used tasks (i.e. Go/No-Go and Delay Discounting Task). Given that RDAB 
incorporates both aspects of reward sensitivity and cognitive control, it is hypothesized that 
RDAB will better predict self-reported impulsivity than performance on Go/No-Go or Delay 
Discounting Tasks.  
Methods. 
Participants and Design. All data collected in Study 2 was part of a larger study visit 
that lasted approximately 3 hours of cognitive tasks and questionnaires. The specific tasks and 
questionnaires analyzed for this study are described below. Participants were 45 healthy adults 
(ages 18-30, 60% female) with normal or corrected-to-normal eye-sight and no current diagnosis 
of depression, as confirmed by self-report, as well as no colorblindness, as confirmed using the 
Ishihara Color vision test (Ishihara, 1973). Participants were recruited via flyers and a university 
listserv. Monetary compensation was provided based on participant task performance (mean = 
$32.85 for study visit; mean = $19.43 for tasks described here).  
Reward Bias Training and Testing. The procedure and task goals described for reward-
training in Study 1 were also used for Study 2; however, in Study 2 participants were made 
explicitly aware of which color circle would be associated with money on some trials and which 
color circle would never be associated with money. Additionally, because Study 1 did not reveal 
an interaction between reward effect and target color, blue and yellow circles were used as the 
target circles in training.1 The color of the rewarded circle was counterbalanced across 
participants. Finally, to account for a longer study visit and ensure that participants were earning 
the same rate of pay per hour, the reward amount was increased to 15 cents on the winning trials. 
                                                        
1 Attentional bias models for PR, PU, and both trained present trials were tested including an interaction term with 




The rate of reward remained the same, such that for the rewarded circle, 80% of trials were 
worth money and 20% were not, whereas no trials were worth money for the unrewarded circle. 
The testing paradigm for Study 2 was identical to that used in Study 1.  
Impulsivity. As in Study 1, participants completed the BIS-11, which again had good 
internal consistency in this sample (α = .76). Another common measure of impulsivity is the 
Urgency, Premeditation, Perseverance, Sensation Seeking, Positive Urgency, Impulsive 
Behavior Scale (UPPS-P).The UPPS-P is a 59-item scale designed to assess impulsivity, 
including lack of planning, lack of perseverance, negative urgency, positive urgency, and 
sensation seeking (Lynam et al., 2006). The scale shows high internal consistency in this sample 
(α = .85). For Study 2, participants completed the UPPS-P in addition to the BIS-11, in order to 
both replicate results from Study 1 and extend to a different scale. 
Go No/Go task. In order to obtain measure of motor inhibitory control, a Go/No-Go task 
was employed.  Every trial began with a fixation screen presented for either 500, 1000, or 1500 
ms, which was followed by a centrally presented circle for 500 ms (see Figure 6). On 75% of 
trials, the color of the circle (white, cyan, green, pink, or orange) indicated that the participant 
should press the spacebar (Go trials). On the other 25% of trials, the color of the circle (yellow or 
blue) indicated that the participant should withhold a response (No-Go trials). The color of the 
No-Go trials corresponded to the PU and PR circles used in the attention tasks. After a short 
practice block (50 trials), participants completed 360 trials of the task across 3 blocks. The 
proportion of false alarms to PU circles was used as a measure of motor inhibitory control 
because the scope of this thesis is focused on how inhibitory control, as commonly assessed in a 
Go/No-Go task, is related to our reward driven attentional bias. Previous work has demonstrated 
that responses to PU No-Go stimuli can serve as measures of inhibitory control, as the behavioral 
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and neural responses on these trials are similar to those of other No-Go tasks (Davidow et al., in 
press; Winter & Sheridan, 2014). Future work will examine the associations between reward 
driven attentional bias across subsequent task types (e.g., Go/No-Go and Spatial Orienting).  
Delay Discounting Task. To measure impulsive choice responding, we employed a 
delayed discounting task (Figure 7). The paradigm was based on previously published work 
(Altamirano, Fields, D’Esposito, & Boettiger, 2011; Boettiger et al., 2007; Mitchell, Fields, 
D’Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; Mitchell, Tavares, Fields, D’Esposito, & Boettiger, 2007; Smith 
& Boettiger, 2012). After a short practice block (8 trials), participants completed 82 trials across 
2 blocks. There were four trial types: “Want”, “Don’t Want”, “Sooner”, and “Larger”. The 
“Want” trial type was of primary interest and consisted of 67% of trials. The remainder of the 
trial types were divided evenly between the control conditions (“Don’t Want”, “Sooner”, and 
“Larger”). The trials consisted of a fixation (500ms), a cue indicating trial type (2000ms), a 
display with two options for participants to decide between (3000 ms), and a fixation with 
varying intertrial intervals (2500 ms, 4000 ms, or 4500 ms). The options displayed each had a 
given monetary amount and time. The options consisted of either $10 or $100 as the full amount 
at one of five future delays (1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, or 6 months) and a discounted 
amount (70%, 85%, 90%, or 95% of the full amount). The earlier option was always listed with 
the lesser amount. In most cases, “Today” was the earlier option, but three months was the 
earlier alternative for some six-month-delay trials. Participants were instructed to make their 
decisions as if they would really be receiving the money amounts indicated at the specified times 
and to indicate their response on the keyboard. For “Want” trials, participants were instructed to 
select their preferred option, whereas less preferred options were selected for “Don’t Want” 
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trials. Participants were instructed to indicate the sooner time for “Sooner” trials and to indicate 
the larger monetary amount for “Larger” trials.  
On 50% of trials, the cue and options were in blue font, and the remaining 50% of trials 
were in yellow font. These colors corresponded to PR and PU colors. The effect of reward 
history on temporal discounting will be reported in a separate paper, and here we focus on 
temporal discounting for trials in the PU color. Temporal discounting was measured using an 
impulsive choice ratio (ICR), which was determined using the proportion of sooner trials 
selected. This measure has been used previously for delay discounting tasks, and has been 
commonly used with this particular task (Ainslie & Monterosso, 2003; Altamirano et al., 2011; 
Boettiger et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2005, 2007; Smith & Boettiger, 2012). One participant’s 
delay discounting task data was excluded due to misunderstanding the instructions.  
Analysis. Similar to Study 1, a mixed measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted on RT with a within-subjects factor of trial type (invalid PR, neutral, valid PR) to test 
a linear effect of orienting. Gender was included as a covariate for all analyses. Because all 
subjects were made explicitly aware, awareness was not included as in effect of interest in 
analyses. As in Study 1, analyses were used to test overall attentional bias, facilitated capture, 
and impaired disengagement and follow-up analyses were used to determine whether reward-
driven bias is exhibited above and beyond training alone. 
 The hypothesis that individual components of RDAB would be linked with impulsivity is 
tested using a linear regression similar to study 1; however, the analysis focused on the both 
trained present (PR and PU) trial type. Analyses were limited to reduce the probability of Type II 
error. This trial type was selected firstly because it tests attentional bias to the rewarded cue (PR) 
while controlling for attentional bias to the trained but never rewarded cue (PU), and secondly 
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because this is trial type showed a relationship with impulsivity in Study 1. The linear regression 
predicted self-reported impulsivity scores from a disengagement score (invalid – neutral RT; 
Table 1) and capture score (neutral – valid inverse RT; Table 1). 
 I have hypothesized that components of RDAB will predict impulsivity. Previous work 
demonstrates that both lack of inhibitory control and impulsive choice responding have also been 
linked with impulsivity. A more stringent test of the relationship between RDAB and impulsivity 
is to examine whether components of RDAB predict impulsivity above and beyond other task 
measures (i.e. false alarms on a go/no-go and impulsive choice responding on a delay 
discounting task).  To test this, an hierarchical regression model was used. The first model 
included No-Go false alarm rate, and proportion of sooner choices selected on the DDT as 
predictors of self-reported impulsivity. The second model included the same predictors as well as 
capture and disengagement scores from the both trained present trial type as predictors of self-
reported impulsivity. The difference in the amount of variance in impulsivity explained by these 
two models is reported.  
Results. 
Training. To assess a reward-effect in training, a mixed-measures ANOVA with reward 
status (rewarded, unrewarded) as a within-subjects factor was implemented on RT. Results 
indicated that participants were faster on trials with the rewarded color than the unrewarded 
color, F(1, 43) = 120.91, p < .01, η2 = .74, as shown in Figure 8.  
Components of Reward-Driven Attentional Bias. As in study 1, it was anticipated that, 
consistent with attentional bias to reward, participants be increasingly slower across valid PR, 
neutral baseline, and invalid PR trials. To test this linear-orienting effect, a mixed-measures 
ANOVA was conducted for performance on PR trials with the within-subjects factors of trial 
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type (invalid, baseline, valid). Results indicated there was an effect of trial type, F(1.54, 66.62) = 
12.06, p < .01, η2 = .22. Within-subjects contrasts confirmed that the effect of trial type was 
linear, such that performance followed the expected pattern across trial types, F(1, 43) = 16.43, p 
< .01, η2 = .28, Figure 9. Separate follow-up ANOVAs tested the specific effect of capture (PR 
valid relative to neutral baseline) and disengagement (PR invalid relative to neutral). Results 
indicated a significant effect of capture, F(1, 43) = 12.44, p < .01, η2 = .22, and a significant 
effect of impaired disengagement, F(1, 43) = 5.45, p = .02, η2 = .11. 
 To test whether the reward-biasing effect was exhibited when both the PR and the PU 
circles were presented at the same time, performance on trials with the both trained present cue 
was analyzed. For this cue, a trial was coded as “valid” if the target appeared in the PR circle and 
considered “invalid” if the target appeared in the PU circle (Figure 3). An ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factor of trial type (invalid, neutral baseline, valid) was conducted for both 
trained present trials. Results indicated there was an effect of trial type, F(2, 86) = 8.39, p < .01, 
η2 = .16. Within-subjects contrasts confirmed that the effect of trial type was linear, such that 
performance followed the expected pattern across trial types, F(1, 43) = 13.36, p < .01, η2 = .24, 
Figure 9. Separate follow-up ANOVAs tested the specific effect of capture (PR valid relative to 
neutral baseline) and disengagement (PR invalid relative to neutral). Results indicated a 
significant effect of capture, F(1, 43) = 6.92, p = .01, η2 = .14, and a trending effect of impaired 
disengagement, F(1, 43) = 3.10, p = .09, η2 = .07. 
As an indication that the orienting effect is reward-specific, we tested whether an 
orienting effect was exhibited for PU cues, which had been trained but never rewarded. A similar 
mixed-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of trial type (invalid, baseline, valid) 
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was implemented for PU trials. There was no effect of trial type, p = .87, indicating no 
attentional bias to PU cues. 
Relationship between Reward-training and Reward-driven Attentional Bias. As 
described in Study 1, here we tested whether the relationship between reward-learning during 
training and RDAB in testing. Training bias was calculated as the difference between RT for 
trials with the rewarded circle and RT for trials with the unrewarded circle. RDAB in testing was 
calculated using the total attentional bias score (Table 1) first for PR trials and then for both 
trained present (PR and PU) trials. Unlike in Study 1, our results here showed no relationship 
between reward-bias on training and reward-bias on test, r(39) = -.02, p = .87.  
Relationships to Impulsivity. Because results from Study 1 indicated that impulsivity is 
linked with variability in reward-driven attentional bias when both PU and PR cues were present, 
our analyses for Study 2 were conducted on the both trained present trial types. A linear 
regression model was conducted similar to Study 1, in which self-reported impulsivity was 
predicted from capture score and disengagement score. Models predicting BIS-11 score and 
UPPS-P score were analyzed separately. Neither model significantly explained impulsivity, p’s > 
.1.  
An hierarchical regression model was conducted, as described above. The first model 
including no-go false alarm rate and ICR in the DDT significantly predicted variance in BIS-11  
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scores, F(3, 40) = 3.312, p = .030, adjusted R2 = .139.2,3 Within this model, higher No-Go false 
alarm rate significantly predicted more impulsivity, β = .318, p = .035. Proportion of sooner 
choices on the delay discounting task did not predict impulsivity, p = .147. When disengagement 
score and capture score were entered as additional predictors, no additional variance in 
impulsivity was explained, R2 change = .028, p = .509. Follow-up bivariate correlation analyses 
confirmed that this was not due to a relationship between task measures, as there were no 
significant correlations among disengagement score, capture score, total RDAB, proportion of 
sooner choices on the DDT, and no-go false alarm rate, p’s > .1. When similar linear regression 
and hierarchical regression models were conducted predicting UPPS total scores, none of the 
models significantly explained variance in UPPS scores, p’s > .1.  Follow-up regressions 
confirmed that total attentional bias to reward measures (Table 1) also did not predict 
impulsivity, as measured either by UPPS or BIS-11, p’s > .1.  
  
                                                        
2 Results from this study indicate that participants were engaged with task, given the low rate of errors of omission 
(M = 1.6%, SD = 2.4%), and that false alarm rate to the PU stimuli (M = 33.7%, SD = 17.3%) were similar to false 
alarm rates in other No-Go tasks that also stimuli with high perceptual overlap and a 25% No-Go trial rate (Luijten, 
Littel, & Franken, 2011; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2004). Additionally, RT’s for false alarms to PU stimuli 
(M = 387 ms, SD = 35 ms) were faster than RT’s for Go stimuli (M = 417 ms, SD = 40 ms), t(44) = 7.20, p < .01. In 
the context of the race model of inhibitory control (Logan & Cowan, 1984), faster responses for false alarm than for 
go trials is consistent with  false alarms escaping inhibitory control. 
 
3 The ICR for PU trials in this study (M = 44.8% sooner choices, SD = 32.5%) was similar to the ICR found in 
control groups for other studies (Altamirano, Fields, D’Esposito, & Boettiger, 2011; Mitchell, Fields, D’Esposito, & 






In this study, we tested the effects of reward-training under explicit awareness on RDAB 
in a cueing paradigm when the prospect of reward was no longer present. When awareness was 
explicitly manipulated in Study 2, our results show more robust reward effects in testing, such 
that reward bias is present as compared to neutral and previously rewarded stimuli, whereas in 
Study 1 reward effects in testing were only present compared to neutral stimuli and specifically 
for individuals who became aware of the reward contingencies. These findings give further 
support to claims that explicit awareness of reward contingencies enhances reward learning 
(Aarts et al., 2008; Bijleveld et al., 2010), and that RDAB is apparent in individuals aware of 
reward contingencies (Bourgeois et al., 2017).  
It was hypothesized that RDAB would show both facilitated capture to reward and 
impaired disengagement from reward. As in study 1, results of study 2 demonstrate an overall 
RDAB effect, such that participants were faster on trials when a target appeared in the previously 
rewarded circle than when a target appeared in the location opposite the previously rewarded 
circle. Additionally, these effects could not be attributed to the effects of training alone, as there 
was no attentional bias to the circle that had been trained but never rewarded. Similar to study 1, 
this effect was linear, such that participants were incrementally faster across invalid previously 
rewarded trials, neutral trials, and valid previously rewarded trials. In Study 1 there was a 
significant facilitated capture to reward but not a significant effect of impaired disengagement 
when directly tested with paired comparisons. The current study, however, demonstrates both a 
significant effect of facilitated capture to reward and of impaired disengagement for previously 
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rewarded relative to neutral cues. Additionally, in study 1, there were no RDAB effects when 
previously rewarded and previously unrewarded cues were presented simultaneously. On the 
other hand, results of study 2 show an overall RDAB effect even on trials with both previously 
rewarded and previously unrewarded cues present. The ladder finding more closely mirrors 
studies that have found reward bias when directly comparing higher and lower value stimuli both 
with a history of training (Anderson, Kronemer, et al., 2016; Anderson & Yantis, 2013; Failing 
& Theeuwes, 2014).  
Our findings also support the argument that facilitated capture is a more consistent, 
robust component of RDAB than is impaired disengagement (Pool et al., 2014, 2016). A 
significant facilitated capture effect was evident in study 1 for previously rewarded relative to 
neutral cues, and the impaired disengagement effect for the same trial type, while in the expected 
direction, did not reach significance. Similarly, in study 2, a significant facilitated capture effect 
for previously rewarded relative to both neutral and previously trained but unrewarded stimuli, 
while the impaired disengagement effect was significant for previously rewarded relative to 
neutral stimuli and trending for previously rewarded relative to previously unrewarded stimuli.  
This study further examined how reward-biasing in training related to reward biasing in 
testing after the prospect of reward had been removed. Echoing previous results (Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2014; Yantis, Anderson, Wampler, & Laurent, 2012), study 1 showed a moderate 
relationship between reward-bias in training and in testing. In study 2, reward-biasing in training 
did not predict the degree of reward-biasing in testing. One possible explanation for this 
difference is that the mechanisms through which reward learning occurs with and without 
explicit instruction differ to some degree. Relative to when no instructions are given, when 
explicit information about contingencies is provided, there is a decrease in neural activation in 
 
 43 
regions involved in sending reward feedback signals, such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
and ventral striatum (Li, Delgado, & Phelps, 2011) which is related to increased recruitment of 
frontal control regions, such as the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Li 
et al., 2011; Tabbert et al., 2011). It has been suggested that recruitment of frontal control 
regions in this type of task, regulate the degree to which a model-free or model-based learning 
approach is employed, with the ladder resulting in dampened activation in the putamen (Lee, 
Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2014). In Study 2, participants can employ this type of model-based 
learning because they are given explicit instructions as to which stimulus is associated with 
reward. As such, participants may be engaging in more top-down strategies during training in 
study 2, which likely differ from the mechanisms through which reward disrupts attention in 
testing, given that top-down strategies in testing should instead limit the attentional bias to 
rewarding stimuli. 
 Finally, it was hypothesized that RDAB, specifically impaired disengagement from 
reward, would relate to impulsivity. Results of study 1 failed to support this specific hypothesis, 
but did indicate that a measure of total bias to reward related to impulsivity. Study 2 was 
designed to further investigate the association between RDAB and impulsivity and to examine 
whether RDAB better predicted impulsivity than other task-based measures, such as motor 
inhibitory control on a Go/No-Go task and impulsive choice responding on a delay discounting 
task. Results of study 2 were inconsistent with the idea that RDAB was related to impulsivity. 
We observed no relationship between RDAB and impulsivity or the components of RDAB and 
impulsivity. Additionally, there is no relationship between RDAB and inhibitory control or 
impulsive choice responding. In contrast, inhibitory control independently predicted impulsivity 
replicating previous findings (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997) and making it unlikely that 
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this null result is due to restricted variability in impulsivity. Given the findings demonstrating 
RDAB is heightened in groups with higher impulsivity, specifically adolescents and individuals 
with a substance use history, (Anderson et al., 2013; Roper et al., 2014) and previous work 
linking impulsivity with RDAB  (Anderson, Kronemer, et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2011b exp 
1), it was expected that RDAB would predict impulsivity in these paradigms. As has been noted, 
though, the association between RDAB and impulsivity is inconsistently observed (Anderson et 
al., 2011b exp 3; Pearson et al., 2015). As such, one explanation for the discrepant findings 
between study 1 and study 2 could be a reflection of an inconsistent relationship between 
impulsivity and RDAB. Furthermore, these studies aimed at testing this hypothesis across a 
normative range of impulsivity. There has been at least one study suggesting task measures of 
cognitive control correlate with self-reported impulsivity more strongly in high-impulsive 
individuals (Johnson, Tharp, Peckham, Sanchez, & Carver, 2016). One possibility is that the 
relationship between RDAB and impulsivity becomes evident at higher levels of impulsivity, as 
might be seen in clinical samples.  
It is possible that RDAB may better reflect inflexible responding (compulsivity) than it 
does acting without forethought (impulsivity). Impulsivity and compulsivity are both linked with 
one another, are both elevated individuals with a history a substance use, and both involve 
fronto-striatal neural circuits (Chamberlain, Stochl, Redden, & Grant, 2018; Robbins, Gillan, 
Smith, de Wit, & Ersche, 2012). Furthermore, exaggerated RDAB in adolescents appears to be 
driven by adolescents persisting in their attentional bias to the previously rewarded stimulus 
relative to adults (Roper et al., 2014). Additionally, the difference between study 1 and study 2 
impulsivity findings could be driven by differing modes of learning in the reward-training 
paradigm. Despite overall RDAB only being found in participants who were aware of the reward 
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contingencies, the relationship between impulsivity and the degree to which participants biased 
processing of reward-related stimuli relative to trained but never rewarded stimuli was 
significant irrespective of awareness status. As such it may be that impulsivity is strictly linked 
with RDAB driven by implicit reward learning. Consistent with this idea, individuals who are 
higher in impulsivity show a behavioral preference for model-free learning and show reductions 
in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation during model-based learning (Deserno et al., 2015).  
The current studies have extended previous work on RDAB in several ways. Firstly, 
these studies evidenced that RDAB can be elicited to a previously rewarded stimulus even when 
testing and training stimuli and goals differ. Secondly, the data support that the cognitive 
processes of RDAB involve spatial orienting, such that reward history both facilitates capture 
and impairs disengagement. Furthermore, capture effects are evidenced more consistently than 
impaired disengagement, which is consistent with more variability in the disengagement effect. 
Thirdly, these studies have furthered previous research on the cognitive mechanisms through 
which RDAB is formulated and sustained, by demonstrating that the effects are evident both 
during training and testing when participants are aware of the reward contingency, either through 
explicit instruction or incidental awareness. Given that the effect was only evident in aware 
individuals, this indicates that explicit strategies for obtaining reward may aid in part the 
formation of RDAB. Finally, these studies cast some doubt on the relationship between 
impulsivity and RDAB, and further clarify that neither facilitated capture nor impaired 
disengagement alone predict self-reported impulsivity. While impulsivity has been characterized 
by reward sensitivity failures in cognitive control, we only observed associations between RDAB 
and impulsivity in Study 1, not in Study 2. Some possible explanations include impulsivity being 
more strongly linked with associations driven from model-free learning, the potential 
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relationship to compulsivity, and the lack of oversampling for high impulsivity in clinical 















Figure 1. Reward-training paradigm adopted from Anderson (2011). Participants were instructed 
to respond to the orientation of a line inside the target circle. For the rewarded target circle, 80% 
of trials were worth money ($0.12 for Study 1; $0.15 for Study 2) and 20% were worth no 
money. For the neutral circle, all trials were worth no money. The color of the rewarded and 










Figure 2. Testing paradigm adopted from Failing and Theeuwes (2014). A double cue was 
displayed for 200 ms with figure-eight premasks, then an offset would reveal target letters for 
800 ms. Participants identified whether the letter “S” or the letter “P” was present. Letters “E” 








Figure 3. (A) Description of the 4 non-predictive cue-types if blue were the previously rewarded 
color in training, yellow were the previously unrewarded color, and colors red and green never 
served as targets during the reward training. (B) Example of “valid” and “invalid” trials for PR, 





Figure 4. Effect of reward on performance during training in Study 1. Participants who reported 
explicit awareness showed better performance to the rewarded circle compared to the 
unrewarded circle. There was no reward effect in participants who reported no awareness of 










Figure 5. Performance on cueing task in study 1 for (A) PR trials, (B) PN trials, and (C) Both 
Trained Present (PR & PN) trials. A significant orienting effect was found for PR trials in the 
aware group, and specifically characterized by a significant reward-driven capture effect. Error 






Figure 6. Go/No-Go paradigm. Every trial began with a fixation screen presented for either 500, 
1000, or 1500 ms, which was followed by a centrally presented circle for 500 ms. On 75% of 
trials, the color of the circle (white, cyan, green, pink, or orange) indicated that the participant 
should press the spacebar (Go trials). On the other 25% of trials, the color of the circle (yellow or 
blue) indicated that the participant should withhold a response (No-Go trials). Participants 





Figure 7. Delay Discounting Task. There were four trial types: “Want”, “Don’t Want”, 
“Sooner”, and “Larger”. The “Want” trial type was of primary interest and consisted of 67% of 
trials. Participants were instructed to make their decisions as if they would really be receiving the 
money amounts indicated at the specified times and to indicate their response on the keyboard. 
For “Want” trials, participants were instructed to select their preferred option, whereas less 
preferred options were selected for “Don’t Want” trials. Participants were instructed to indicate 
the sooner time for “Sooner” trials and to indicate the larger monetary amount for “Larger” trials. 
The remainder of the trial types were divided evenly between the control conditions (“Don’t 
Want”, “Sooner”, and “Larger”). The options consisted of either $10 or $100 as the full amount 
at one of five future delays (1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 3 months, or 6 months) and a discounted 
amount (70%, 85%, 90%, or 95% of the full amount). The earlier option was always listed with 
the lesser amount. Participants were instructed to make their decisions as if they would really be 






Figure 8. Significant effect of reward on training in Study 2. Error bars are within subjects 95% 









Figure 9. Performance on cueing task in study 2 for (A) PR trials, (B) PU trials, and (C) Both 
Trained Present (PR & PU) trials. A significant orienting effect was found for PR trials, 
specifically characterized by both a significant disengagement effect and a significant capture 
effect. For Both Trained Present (PR & PU) Trials, there was an orienting effect found with a 
significant capture effect and trending disengagement effect. Error bars are within subjects 95% 
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N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table 1. Description of how disengagement and capture is determined for each trial type. PR = 




Source B SE B β t p 
Constant 60.36 2.85 
 
21.18 <.01 
Attentional Bias on Both 
Present (Valid Both 
Present – Invalid Both 
Present) 
0.27 0.09 0.465 3.18 <.01 
Awareness 0.684 3.44 0.030 0.20 .84 
Gender 2.207 3.453 0.096 0.639 .53 
 
Table 2. Results of regression analysis predicting BIS-11 scores from total attentional bias on 
both trained present (PR and PU) trials. Adjusting for number of predictors, the model explained 




APPENDIX A: REWARD-CONTINGENCY AWARENESS PROBE MODIFIED FROM 
ANDERSON (2015) 
Which option do you believe best describes the part of the experiment in which you were earning 
money (please choose only one): 
1. The blue circle was generally worth more than the yellow circle regardless of what the 
line orientation was 
2. The yellow circle was generally worth more than the blue circle regardless of what the 
line orientation was 
3. The two circles were worth the same overall, but one color was worth more when it 
appeared with a horizontal line and the other was worth more when it appeared with a 
vertical line 
4. Both color circles were generally worth more when presented with a vertical line 
5. Both color circles were generally worth more when presented with a horizontal line 
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